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With the global financial crisis hitting many countries, 
policymakers around the world have been weighing 
different countercyclical policies to support aggregate 
demand and restore growth. The analysis in this paper 
estimates a Structural Vector Error Correction model for 
Tunisia in order to identify the impact of fiscal policy 
shocks on real output. The authors find that public 
investment has a small impact on output in the short run 
but is an important medium-term growth-enhancing 
countercyclical instrument that has a robust impact on 
growth. Raising public investment by 1 dinar yields 
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0.12 dinar the first year, 0.30 dinar the second year, half 
a dinar the third year, and 1.08 dinars the sixth year. 
An increase in recurrent expenditure has a smaller but 
positive and persistent impact on real output. For Tunisia 
to obtain a larger short-term impact of public spending 
on output, procurement processes should be made faster 
and simpler. Finally, the analysis finds a countercyclical 
pattern of real public investment vis-à-vis real output and 
a relative rigidity/inelasticity of recurrent expenditures to 
output fluctuations.  
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Because of its limited foreign exposure, Tunisia’s financial sector was not directly affected by the 
global financial crisis that emanated in the US in late 2008.
1 However, Tunisia has built strong 
trade and investment links with the European Union economies over the past quarter century. The 
EU absorbs 76 percent of Tunisia’s exports and is the origin of 70 percent of FDI inflows in the 
country. As a result, due to the sharp decline in growth in Europe in 2008 and 2009, Tunisia’s 
export growth (in constant price) dropped from 12 percent in 2007 to 1 percent in 2008 and 
declined further in the first half of 2009 (-12 percent) as exports of textiles and clothing and 
automobile components plummeted.   
 
Although textiles and clothing, leather and footwear (henceforth TCLF) and the mechanical and 
electrical sectors combined account for about 65 percent of exports, the decline in external 
demand of these products is unlikely to create a balance of payment problem in Tunisia. Indeed, 
the import content of export in these sectors is about 85 percent and imports typically decline in 
tandem with exports.  Furthermore, continuing growth in FDI allows a convenient financing of 
the current account. In 2008, FDI increased by 40 percent to 5.6 percent of GDP representing 119 
percent of the current account deficit.  
 
Instead, the main concern of Tunisian policymakers is lower GDP growth and declining 
employment in the manufacturing sector in the short term.  The manufacturing sector accounts for 
20 percent of total jobs, 63.7 percent of which are in “totally” exporting firms.
2   The TCLF 
sector alone accounts for 48 percent of manufacturing employment and 9 percent of total 
employment. The mechanical and electrical sector, on the other hand, represents 16% of 
manufacturing jobs and 3.5 percent of employment.
3  Clearly, given their weigh in employment 
within the manufacturing sector, the sharp decline in export in these two sectors is a threat not 
only to growth but also to employment.  
 
A key question is thus what type of countercyclical policies can help offset the negative shock on 
exports and moderate the economic slowdown and job losses. Many countries have taken 
emergency measures in late 2008 to support the exporting sector. The Tunisian government is no 
                                                 
1 For instance, the stock market grew by 9 percent in 2008.  
2 Totally exporting firms are those that export 100 percent of their production. In Tunisia, a law enacted in 
1971 (offshore regime) grants several fiscal and financial incentives to these firms, including duty-free 
imports of raw materials and equipments entering the production, 10 year tax holiday and free repatriation 
of profits. There also are “partially” exporting firms. Exports (in value) over GDP equals 47 percent. 
3 Hydrocarbons, Tunisia’s third export item is capital-intensive but not labor intensive.  3 
 
exception. It has reacted swiftly in December 2008 by adopting several temporary measures to 
support exporting firms affected by the crisis, including partial exemption of social security 
contributions, fiscal incentives, and credit guarantees. These measures combined with a strong 
desire by firm managers to keep their trained employees, seem to have helped reduce 
significantly job losses.  
 
In addition to emergency measures directed to the exporting sector, governments around the 
world have considered countercyclical measures to support aggregate demand and restore growth. 
To this effect, the tool considered by most countries is a fiscal stimulus (discretionary increase in 
public spending and/or tax reduction). The theoretical case for a fiscal stimulus  rests on the fact 
that (i) the origin of the current crisis is well identified: strong adverse shocks to aggregate 
demand following the global financial crisis; (ii) conventional monetary policy –e.g. reducing the 
interest rate—is likely to be ineffective because the pre-crisis investment boom in many countries 
led to excess capacities and; (iii) monetary transmission from the central bank to the real sector 
activity is not effective or predictable because of confidence crisis in the credit markets. Factors 
(ii) and (iii) dramatically reduce the comparative advantage of monetary policy over fiscal policy 
(IMF 2008).  
 
Empirically, there is a rich literature on the effects of fiscal policy on output and other 
macroeconomic variables (see, for instance, Blanchard and Perotti 2002, de Castro and de Cos 
2008, Giordano, Momigliano, Neri, and Perotti 2005 and Giavazzi and Pagano 1990). However, 
while the empirical literature for developed countries is rich, not many studies exist on 
developing countries (see Table A1 for a list of recent studies). Furthermore, the issue of the sign 
and magnitude of the effects of fiscal policies across different countries is very much an open 
empirical question.  
 
We contribute to the literature by estimating the impact and profile of fiscal stimuli on Tunisia. 
We start by describing the fiscal policy context. Then, we describe the empirical strategy used to 
estimate the impacts of fiscal variables on output. This allows one to gauge the magnitude of 
fiscal stimuli (in the form of discretionary public spending) needed to offset growth slowdown in 





2. The fiscal policy context 
 
During the past 10 years, prudent fiscal policies have helped maintain Tunisia’s fiscal deficit at or 
below 3 percent. Indeed, the overall fiscal deficit was reduced from 4.2 percent in 1997 to 1.2 
percent of GDP in 2008 (Figure 1). This, combined with intensified efforts to reduce external 
debt in 2005-2008, contributed to a sharp reduction of public debt, from 58 percent in 2005 to 
47.5 percent in 2008 (Figure 2). This in turn helped reduce interest payments and free up space to 
address the global food and fuel crises in 2008 (food and fuel subsidies increased sharply by 1.3 
percent of GDP to reach 3.7 percent of GDP in 2008 and yet overall fiscal deficit remained at 2.1 
percent).  
 
Public debt reduction combined with pro-active expenditure reallocation has been the main 
approach used to manage the budget deficit. However, a question is whether the level of public 
debt itself is so high as to be a constraint to undertaking countercyclical fiscal policies. Clearly, at 
47.5 percent of GDP, Tunisia’s public debt remains relatively high (slightly above the median 
level for emerging economies with similar Sovereign Rating). However, the share of public debt 
exposed to exchange rate and rollover risks has declined significantly in recent years, owing to 
efficient debt management. Government-guaranteed loans were estimated at about 11 percent of 
GDP at end-2007. Risks are contained by the following factors: (i) almost 82 percent of the 
external debt stock is in medium and long-term liabilities, 70  percent of which is owed to 
multilateral and bilateral creditors, implying limited rollover risks; (ii) around 75 percent of the 
debt is contracted in fixed interest rates suggesting little interest rate risk; and (iii) the stock of 
reserves more than fully covers all short-term liabilities (remaining maturity) in 2007 (IMF 2008).  
 
Thus, to the extent that additional debt is invested in growth-enhancing areas, the level of public 
debt is not a major constraint in undertaking countercyclical fiscal policies. A fiscal deficit of up 
to 4 percent of GDP would still leave the public debt-to-GDP ratio below 50 percent (its 2007 
level). Furthermore, domestic borrowing is unlikely to crowd out private investment: the deposit 
to credit ratio of the banking system stood at 1.15 percent in 2008 and 1.10 percent in the first 
quarter of 2009, denoting a situation of excess liquidity (Central Bank of Tunisia). 
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3. Dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output  
 
Our objective is to determine the extent to which increasing public expenditures can help offset 
the deceleration in growth driven by the decline in external demand. To that effect, we use a 
model to simulate the effect of 1 dinar of increase in public spending (public investment and 
recurrent expenditure) on Tunisia’s GDP in the short and medium-term.  In other words, how 
much additional GDP can be obtained from 1 dinar additional public spending?  
 
3.1. The impact of fiscal stimulus: empirical strategy 
 
The system to be estimated consists of four variables:   Y I G G X
iv R Inv
t , , ,
Pr  .  
Inv G  is public investment, 
R G current expenditure,  
iv I
Pr private investment  and Y output. The 
extent to which an increase in 
Inv G  and 
R G  affect Y , as well as the temporal profile of the impact 
(lag and persistence of the shock) is the main focus of this paper. 
 
Most recent studies of the impact of fiscal shocks on macroeconomic variables use the structural 
vector autoregressive regression (VAR) approach proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
Perotti (2002).  This approach consists of isolating the structural shocks in a VAR system by 
imposing restrictions based on economic theory and institutional features that constrain the 
behavior of policy makers. For instance, government spending categories are generally 
contemporaneously unaffected by GDP. Therefore, reactions of fiscal policy to output changes 
only result from so called “automatic” responses, which are defined by existing laws and 
regulations. All fiscal policy developments in a given quarter or a year in some instances, which 6 
 
do not reflect automatic responses, are basically seen as structural fiscal policy shocks, which are 
exogenous to output. This approach allows the identification of genuine shocks that hit the 
economy. We describe below the specific restrictions imposed in the coefficients of the model 
used here.     
 
In matrix form, a Structural VAR (SVAR) could be written as: 
t t t B DX AX    1         (2) 
It follows that the reduced-form VAR is equal to: 





          (3) 
or, equivalently:   
t t t u FX X   1             ( 4 )  
with    
D A F
1     and    t t B A u 
1     
 










       and the structural 
coefficients, once VAR is estimated, one needs to impose restrictions on the relationship between 
the innovations  t u  and the structural shocks t  . We will come back to this below. 
 
SVAR models are appropriate when there is co-integration between the variables of the system. If 
co-integration tests cannot reject the hypothesis of one or more co-integration relationships 
among the variables, a structural vector error-correction model (SVEC) should be used. An 
SVEC is a transformed SVAR to include an error correction term necessary when the variables 
are co-integrated.  
 
The reduced-form of a first–order VEC can be written as:  
 
t t t t X X X          1 1        (5) 
 
t t B A  
1           ( 6 )  
 
3.2. Variable measurement and data source 
 
All variables are expressed in real terms and in logarithm. Public investment (called Titre 2 in 
Tunisia’s fiscal jargon) is the gross fixed capital formation by the public sector, including state-7 
 
owned enterprises. It includes direct expenditures on infrastructure and equipment in all sectors, 
donor-financed projects and the state’s external borrowing on behalf of the private sector. Current 
expenditures are expenses under Tunisia’s Titre 1, i.e, salaries and wages, goods and services, 
interest payments and transfers and subsidies. In this paper, we exclude interest payments from 
recurrent expenditures. Private investment is measured as the gross fixed capital formation by the 
domestic private sector. 
 
Both recurrent expenditures and GDP are converted to real terms by using the GDP deflator. 
Public and private investment variables are adjusted by the deflator of investment (base 2000) 
from both the Institut National des Statistiques and the World Development Indicators. Because 
the deflators for 2006 and 2007 were missing in both databases, we approximated them by 
assuming that the deflator has changed at the same rate as on average in the period 2000-2005.  
 
3.3. Unit roots and co-integration tests 
 
Tables 2 and 3 in annex show the results of the unit root tests. They show that all the variables in 
the system have a unit root in level but are stationary in first difference. We then apply the 
Johansen (1988 and 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990 and 1992) co-integration tests.
4 As 
Table 4 shows, both tests indicate that the null that there is no co-integration relationship between 
the two variables (r=0) is rejected at 5 percent. On the other hand, one cannot however reject the 
hypothesis that there is one co-integration relationship (r<=1) against r=2. An SVEC model is 
thus the correct specification.   
 
3.4. Impact of fiscal shocks –impulse responses 
 
Restrictions imposed on short-term multipliers 
For the multiplier matrix to be identified, some assumptions should be made regarding the 
contemporaneous relationships between the variables of the system. In our case, we have four 
variables and have imposed the following restrictions in the SVEC short-term multiplier matrix 
based on economic theory and specific institutional constraints (see Table 5): 
  Output does not affect public investment or recurrent expenditures instantaneously. This 
assumption may be seen as strong a priori because we use annual data and Tunisia does 
undertake revised budget laws from time to time (twice in the 1990s and 4 times since 
                                                 
4 In the Johansen framework, this a full information maximum likelihood estimation of a system 
characterized by П co-integrating vectors. 8 
 
2000). However, all revisions of the budget laws are so far driven by response to 
exogenous shocks: oil and commodity price shocks chiefly.  
  Public investment cannot react instantaneously to recurrent expenditures and vice-versa. 
In other words, once credits for public investment and recurrent expenditures are 
allocated, these are not changed within the fiscal year; Tunisia’s virement rules provide a 
little flexibility within and between major recurrent budget heads (wages, goods and 
services, etc.) but no flexibility regarding reallocations between recurrent and investment 
budgets.
5  
  Recurrent expenditure does not affect private investment instantaneously even though its 
non-contemporaneous effect is expected to be positive. Indeed, maintenance of road, 
electricity, communication infrastructures for instance increases the marginal 
productivity of existing private inputs (both capital and labor), thereby lowering marginal 
production costs and increasing the level of private investment and production. 
  Private investment does not affect public investment and recurrent expenditures 
instantaneously. 
 
Impact of public investment and recurrent expenditures on output  
 
Table 1 below shows the impact of one dinar of increase in public investment, recurrent 
expenditure and private investment on GDP over time. Clearly, the impact of fiscal stimulus is 
positive and effective in the case of Tunisia in the medium-term. Raising public investment by 1 
dinar yields 0.12 dinar the first year, 0.30 dinar the second year and half a dinar the third year. 
The multiplier is greater than 1 in the 6
th years following the 1 dinar shock to public investment. 
Although public investment is not only about infrastructure, this finding is consistent with the 
empirical literature that finds a positive impact of infrastructure spending flows on output, 
growth, or productivity (Agenor, Nabli and Youssef 2005). We also find a positive and consistent 
impact of public investment on private investment. Public investment in road, electricity, 
communication infrastructures, public capital in education, health, etc. can increase the marginal 
productivity of existing private inputs (both capital and labor), thereby lowering marginal 
production costs and increasing the level of private investment and production.  
 
                                                 
5 Since 2004, ministers can reallocate up to 2 percent of total expenditure within major budget heads 
(wages, goods and services, etc.) and additional amounts with approval of the MoF. Virements between 
major budget heads are permitted, with MoF approval, for only up to 2 percent of the lower budgeted 
amount of the two heads. Inter-head virements of amounts greater than 2 percent require Council of 
Ministers approval, but such requests are quite rare. 9 
 
Interestingly, recurrent expenditure has a small but positive impact on output. As defined above, 
recurrent expenditures include salaries and treatment, public spending in goods and services and 
transfers and subsidies. The positive impact on output reflects the first two items. An increase in 
salaries and treatment leads to either immediate rise in private consumption or an increase in 
private savings, ultimately transformed into demand for investment goods. Either way, a rise in 
salaries and treatment affects output. Public spending in goods and services can also support in a 
straightforward fashion. Indeed, some components of current spending such as maintaining of 
roads and schools are important to maintain the quality of the services financed by public capital 
and contribute to ensuring the profitability of infrastructure investments. Spending on operation 
and maintenance that keeps existing infrastructure in good condition or spending that contributes 
to health outcomes and the accumulation of human capital–can promote growth more effectively 
than capital expenditure per se (Moreno-Dodson 2008). Finally, a reallocation of subsidies to 
public investment or recurrent spending is growth-enhancing, all things being equal. 
 
There are not many studies of the impact of dynamic fiscal shocks to output on countries similar 
to Tunisia. The study by Restrepo and Rincon (2006) on Chile and Colombia is an exception. 
These authors use an SVAR and SVEC model respectively to calculate spending multipliers for 
Chile and Colombia using quarterly data over 1989 through 2005. They find that a one Chilean 
peso increase in government spending has a transitory positive effect of 1.9 pesos on real GDP 
growth, which stabilizes at 1.37 cents. For Colombia, the authors find that a one peso increase in 
public spending translates, at impact, into a 0.12 increase in the level of GDP and stabilizes at 
0.15 peso.   
 
The size of fiscal multipliers depends, among other things, on leakages into saving and imports.  
Multipliers tend to be smaller for economies more open to trade (i.e., higher leakages into 
imports) and more susceptible to financial market constraints (i.e., upward pressure on real 
interest rates), or when it is subject to monetary policy that offsets the fiscal stimulus (e.g., IMF, 
2008). Many cross-country studies have found small fiscal multipliers and in some cases 
multipliers with a negative sign (Christiansen 2008). The most notable studies with “negative 
multipliers” are found in the literature on expansionary fiscal contraction initiated by Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1990) and surveyed in Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002). 
 
Finally, a result that requires further investigation is the small impact of private investment on 
growth. Indeed, real private investment has a positive but smaller impact on GDP that public 10 
 
spending (Table 1). This finding is consistent the widely held view that private investment in the 
period of investigation went mostly to low value-added sectors.  
 
Table 1. Impact of 1 Tunisian Dinar Increase in Public Investment, Current Expenditure 
and Private Investment on GDP over time 
 
  Real Public Investment   Real current expenditure   
T=1 0.12  0.08  0.04 
T=2 0.30  0.16  0.10 
T=3 0.50  0.25  0.14 
T=4 0.69  0.33  0.19 
T=5 0.89  0.41  0.23 
T=6 1.08  0.48  0.26 
Note: The shock that hits the VAR is of size 1. Thus from table 8’s coefficient (see annex), one 






























   
 
Impulse responses  
 
Figures 3 to 5 provides more details regarding the profile of the response of output to shocks to 
public investment, recurrent expenditure and private investment. They suggest that public 
investment is strongly growth-enhancing countercyclical instrument in the medium-term that can 
effectively counterbalance the shortfall in growth driven by the sharp decline in external demand. 
Figures 6-8 show the feedback effect of real GDP to the fiscal variables (starting t+1) and on 
private investment. Public investment follows a contra-cyclical pattern in the medium-term in 
contrast with recurrent expenditures that display a relative rigidity and insensitivity of output 
fluctuations. The contra-cyclicality of public investment seems at odd with what is found in most 
developing countries where a pro-cyclical bias is more prevalent (Gavin and Perotti 1997, 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh 2004 and Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel 2008). Indeed, public 
investment tends to increase in good times because higher growth leads to increased public 
revenues and greater ease in financing public investment. The relationship between real GDP and 
real investment, on the other hand, displays an “accelerator” model pattern in the medium term. 
In his “accelerator” hypothesis, Samuelson (1958) showed that higher expected demand (a proxy 







Figure 3. Accumulated impact of public 
investment on output 
 
Figure 4. Accumulated impact of Recurrent 
expenditure on output  
 
Figure 5. Accumulated impact of private 
investment on output 
 
Figure 6. Accumulated feedback effect of 
output on public investment  
 
 
Figure 7. Accumulated feedback effect of 
output on recurrent expenditures 
 







This paper attempted to examine whether a fiscal stimulus can be an effective countercyclical tool 
in Tunisia. Indeed, Tunisia is now affected by the global crisis, through the EU. About 80% of 
Tunisia’s exports are shipped to Europe, which is now in recession. Growth has declined by 6 
percentage points in the EU –compared to 2008 and this is leading to a significant drop in the 
EU’s external demand, thereby hitting Tunisia. The latter’s exports dropped from 12% growth in 
2007 to only 1% in 2008 and have entered the negative territory in the first quarter of 2009. 
Therefore, it is urgent to identify policies that can counterbalance somewhat the expected decline 
in GDP growth.  
 
We estimate a Structural Vector Error Correction model for Tunisia in order to identify the 
impact of fiscal policy shocks on real output. The results suggest that public investment is an 
important growth-enhancing medium-term countercyclical instrument that can effectively 
counterbalance the shortfall in growth driven by the sharp decline in external demand. The 
multipliers endogenously estimated from the SVEC model show that raising public investment by 
1 dinar yields 0.12 dinar the first year, 0.30 dinar the second year, half a dinar the third year and 
1.08 dinars the 6th years. An increase in recurrent expenditure has a small but positive and 
persistent impact on real output. The feedback effect from real output to fiscal variables indicate a 
countercyclical pattern of real public investment and a relative rigidity/inelasticity of recurrent 
expenditures to output fluctuations.  
 
This result provides some confidence regarding the effectiveness of a fiscal spending stimulus in 
the case of Tunisia. Indeed, our results are based on historical data and on an average level of 
efficiency of public spending. If Tunisia speeds up procurement procedures and targets high-
growth-enhancing projects, our spending multipliers can be considered as a lower band, i.e., one 
dinar spent today could yield a higher additional output than in the past.  In addition to a rapid 
execution, to maximize impact, the public spending should be well-targeted. We also find that 
reallocation of public spending is not growth neutral. Indeed, reducing fuel subsidies to increase 
public investment or even maintenance or other non-subsidies items can help boost growth. A 
finding that deserves further investigation however is the contra-cyclical nature of public 
investment. Does it reflect an explicit or implicit fiscal rule or does it indicate the existence of 
strong stabilizers?  13 
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Table 1. Trade intensity and business cycle correlation 
 
SVEC Model: 
Table 2: Unit roots tests* – variables in level 
 
Variable** Critical  values  ADF 
1% 5%  10%  Level 
Current_exp -2.56  -1.94  -1.62  3.1235 











*Ouput from J-multi 
**Variables are in logs of their real 
 
Table 3: Unit roots tests* - variables in first difference 
 
Variable** Critical  values  ADF 
1% 5%  10%  First  difference 
dCurrent_exp**** -3.96  -3.41  -3.13  -4.3326 
















prob  1%  5% 10% 
0  r   134.64 0.0000  60.81  53.94  50.50 
1  r   30.73 0.1408 40.78  35.07  32.25 
2  r   12.17 0.4419 24.69  20.16  17.98 






growth export (%) 
Average annual 
growth import (%) 
Trade intensity  Correlation of 
business cycles 















































Real_GDP Real  current 
expenditure 
0.1143 -0.0049 0.0034 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0849 -0.0320 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0731 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0347 
 
   
Table 6. SVEC Impulse Function: Response of GDP to Shocks  
 
  Real Public Investment   Real current expenditure  Real private investment 
T=1 0.03  0.019  0.011 
T=2 0.075  0.041  0.024 
T=3 0.124  0.062  0.036 
T=4 0.173  0.082  0.047 
T=5 0.222  0.102  0.057 
T=6 0.27  0.121  0.066 
 
 
Table 7. Impact of 1 Tunisian Dinar Increase in Public Investment, Current Expenditure 
and Private Investment on GDP over time 
 
  Real Public Investment  Real current expenditure Real private investment
T=1 0.12  0.08  0.04 
T=2 0.30  0.16  0.10 
T=3 0.50  0.25  0.14 
T=4 0.69  0.33  0.19 
T=5 0.89  0.41  0.23 
T=6 1.08  0.48  0.26 
Note: The shock that hits the VAR is of size 1. Thus from table 8’s coefficient, one can 































   
 
 
Table 8. SVEC impulse (feedback effect of GDP on fiscal variables and private investment) 
 
  Real Public Investment  Real private investment  Real current expenditure 
T=1 -0.017  -0.02  -0.006 
T=2 -0.03  -0.009  0.001 
T=3 -0.023  0.011  0.02 
T=4 0.005  0.034  0.048 
T=5 0.05  0.059  0.082 





The Johansen Co-Integration Tests: 
 
We apply the Johansen (1988 and 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990 and 1992) co-
integration tests. In this framework, the hypothesis of co-integration is formulated as a hypothesis 
of reduced rank of the long run impact matrix of the ECM. The procedure for testing co-










1               (1) 
 
Where Yt denotes an (n x 1) vector of I (1) variables. The k-th order vector autoregressive (VAR) 
representation of Yt is written as:  
 
      
 
k
i t i i t i t T t t Y Y
1 ,.... 2 , 1        (2) 
 
Each of the i  is a (n x n) matrix of parameters,   is an identically and independently 
distributed (i.i.d) n-dimensional vector of residuals with zero mean and variance matrix 
  ,   is 
a constant term and t is a trend.  
 
The estimates of  
t i         .... 1 (
1   describe the short run dynamics of Yt;   
The estimates of       
1 ) ... 1 (
k  capture the long run adjustment of Yt. In other words, it is 
the   matrix that conveys information about the long run relationship among the Yt. The rank 
of  , r, determines the number of co-integrating vectors since it determines how many linear 
combinations of Yt  are stationary.
6  
 
Johansen (1988, 1991) proposed two statistics to test for the co-integration rank (r) for which he 
derived the statistical distribution, the trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue. The trace stat, 
λtrace, tests the null hypothesis that at most r co-integrating vector exist against a general 
alternative hypothesis of more than r co-integrating vectors;  
 
Trace Statistics: (     
 
n
r i i T trace
1
^
) 1 ln( )    
 
The maximum eigenvalue statistics, λmax, and which tests the null of r co-integrating vector 
against the alternative of r+1. 
 
Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic: ( ) 1 1 ln( max)
^
     r T    
^
i  s are the estimated eigenvalues (characteristic roots) obtained from the  matrix; T is the 
number of usable observations. 
 
                                                 
6 There are three possible cases in the testing procedures: 
(i) If  r = n, the   matrix has a full rank and all the variables are stationary in level. 
(ii) If  r = 0, Π contains no long-run information, and a VAR in differences would be the correct 
specification. 
(iii) If  0 < r < n  and there are (n x r) matrices   and   such that  '  . And there are r co-integrating 
relations among elements of Yt.    denotes the co-integration vectors. It has the property that 
t Y '   is 
stationary even though Y itself in non-stationary. The matrix   measures the strength of the co-integrating 
vectors in the VECM, as it represents the speed of adjustment parameters (adjustment coefficients).  